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NOTES 
NEW YORK V. FERBER: 
COMPELLING EXTENSION OF 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
INFRINGEMENT. 
INTRODUCTION 
In New York v. Ferber,l the United States Supreme Court 
conducted its first inquiry into the constitutionality of a statute 
"directed at and limited to depictions of sexual activity involv-
ing children. "I Paul Ferber, owner of a Manhattan bookstore 
specializing in sexually oriented material, sold two films to an 
undercover police officer. The films chiefly depicted young boys 
masturbating. Ferber was indicted under New York statutes reg-
ulating child pornography.- Ferber was subsequently acquitted 
of the section 263.10 charge, which required a finding that the 
material at issue be obscene, and convicted under section 263.15, 
for which no proof of obscenity was required.· The Appellate Di-
vision of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction without opinion.s 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding section 
263.15 violative of the first amendment.s The court reasoned 
that given a different penal code section's explicit inclusion of an 
obscenity requirement, the statute employed to convict the de-
fendant impliedly regulated only nonobscene child pornogra-
1. New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982). 
2. rd. at 3353. 
3. The trial judge rejected Ferber's first amendment attack on the two sections in 
denying a motion to dismiBB the indictment. 96 Misc. 2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1978). 
4. See notes 24 and 26, supra. 
6. 72 A.D.2d 668, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980). 
6. 62 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981). 
475 
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phy.7 As the traditional standard for exclusion from first amend-
ment protection is predicated on a finding that the material at 
issue be obscene, the court concluded that the statute in ques-
tion targeted a form of expression entitled to first amendment 
protection.8 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the New 
York Appellate Court's decision, upholding the constitutionality 
of the statute on the grounds that the state's interest in protect-
ing the welfare of its youth outweighed any first amendment in-
terests at stake.9 Given that the defendant was prosecuted under 
a statute which did not require that the proscribed depiction be 
obscene, the United States Supreme Court's opinion marked a 
clear departure from the obscenity standard previously used for 
determining first amendment applicability.lo Particularly impor-
tant in this regard is the Court's lack of reverence for constitu-
tional sanctity when concerning state regulation of child pornog-
raphy. The state's interest in providing for the health and well-
being of its youth may currently, under the appropriate circum-
stances, be so overwhelming as to deny an individual rights 
heretofore available under the first amendment. This note seeks 
both to define the particular forms of expression involving 
juveniles which, according to the Court, do not warrant constitu-
tional protection, and to question the Court's rationale in setting 
precedent which narrows the scope of the first amendment. 
OBSCENITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIOR TO Ferber 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,l1 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that particular well-defined areas of ex-
pression are not entitled to constitutional protection.1:I For the 
first time the Court clearly articulated that obscenity is outside 
the realm of constitutionally protected expression, reasoning 
that the societal and moral interest in regulating obscene mate-
rial clearly outweighs any social value possibly derived from the 
7. Id. at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
8.ld. 
9. 102 S. Ct. at 3357. 
10.ld. 
11. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
12. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problems. These include the .lewd and obscene .... n Id. at 572. 
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lawful existence and dissemination of such material. 18 
The Supreme Court again refused first amendment protec-
tion for obscenity in Roth v. United States,I4 stating that speech 
without socially redeeming value had historically, albeit implic-
itly, been excluded from constitutional protection. II Yet, in a 
subsequent case the Court was unable to evade "the intractable 
obscenity problem. "UI Despite the judicially formulated rule that 
obscenity is utterly without social value and, therefore, beyond 
the auspices of the first amendment, there remained the ques-
tion of which materials and activities were "obscene." 
In Miller v. California,l"I the Supreme Court voiced new 
guidelines for the purpose of excising obscene material from first 
amendment protection. Acknowledging "the inherent dangers of 
undertaking to regulate any form of expression,"11 the Court 
modified the per se rule of Roth, which exempted all obscene 
forms of expression from constitutional coverage, and asserted 
the need for substantive limitations on the permissible scope of 
regulation. The Court stated that "a state offense must also be 
limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient 
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offen-
sive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."11 While imposing these 
limitations, the Court also shifted its standard from "utterly" 
without social value to without "serious" social value. This shift 
was most significant in that it. reflected the Court's increasing 
willingness to tamper with its social value inquiry and, in so do-
ing, restrict first amendment applicability. 
13. Jd. 
14. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
15. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the re-
jection of obscenity 88 utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the univer-
sal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in 
the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscen-
ity lawS of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws 
enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956. 
Jd. at 485. 
16. Interstate Circuit, Inc. V. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.). 
17. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
18. Jd. at 23. 
19. Jd. at 24. 
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Ferber: THE NEW YORK OPINION 
The initial issue before New York Court of Appeals was the 
appropriateness of the defendant's overbreadth attack. The 
court noted that where first amendment rights are at issue, a 
party may generally challenge the constitutionality of a statute 
"on its face," despite the fact that the party's own rights are not 
violated under the particular circumstances of the case.20 The 
court acknowledged the view stated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,21 
that an overbreadth attack is more stringent in its application to 
conduct than to "pure speech."22 Nevertheless, the court chose 
to view the statute as being aimed at "traditional forms of ex-
pression,"23 thereby allowing the defendant to challenge the 
statute's constitutionality. 
The court of appeals began its substantive inquiry by con-
sidering whether section 263.15 regulated expression tradition-
ally entitled to protection under the first amendment.2' After 
finding that a companion provision directly prohibited the 
knowing dissemination of obscene material, the court concluded 
that section 263.15 specifically targeted nonobscene material. 211 
Hence, the court found that the statute prohibited the pro-
motion of materials traditionally afforded constitutional pro-
tection. lI6 
20. 52 N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65, citing Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973), (first amendment concerns compel the adjudication 
of overbreadth challenges). 
21. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
22. 52 N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65, citing 413 U.S. at 
614-15. See note 62, supra. 
23. ld. at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65. 
24. "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing 
the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance 
which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 263.15 (West 1980). "Promote means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, 
lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, pre-
vent, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same." ld. at § 263.5. "Sexual 
performance means any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a 
child less than sixteen years of age." ld. at § 263.1. "Sexual conduct means actual or 
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, 
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals." ld. at § 263.3. 
25. 52 N.Y.2d at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. "A person is guilty of 
promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and 
content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes ob-
scene sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10 
(West 1980). 
26. 52 N.Y.2d at 678, 42.2 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
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The court cO,ntinued by recognizing that "First Amendment 
rights are not absolute and may on occasion be outweighed by 
superior government interests."lI'1 It further asserted that "[t]he 
State has a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of mi-
nors within its borders, and, at times, that interest may trans-
cend first amendment concerns."18 As section 263.15 sought to 
regulate the depiction of juvenile sex without regard for the ju-
risdiction in which those depictions were recorded, the court 
found the statute to be overbroad in its application. I. To the 
extent that the New York Legislature's purpose in enacting sec-
tion 263.15 was interpreted by the court as the protection of ad-
olescents from danger to their health and well-being, the court 
found the statute to be under inclusive on the ground that it 
didn't uniformly accomplish its purpose. so That is, the statute 
discriminated against sexually oriented t~es of juvenile abuse. 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION 
Justice White, delivering the unanimous oplDlOn of the 
Court, began by asserting that the New York Court of Appeals 
proceeded on the assumption that the guidelines espoused in 
Miller applied when ascertaining the constitutionality of child 
pornography laws.81 The Court observed that 44 [t]he Miller stan-
dard, like its predecessors, was an accommodation between the 
State's interest in protecting the sensibilities of unwilling recipi-
ents from exposure to pornographic material and the dangers of 
censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws."sa Pref-
acing its departure from the Miller standard, the Court ex-
pressed its conviction that "states are. entitled to greater leeway 
in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children. "88 The 
Court subsequently engaged in a five-point analysis in support 
of its conclusion. 
In its first point the Court affirmed that states have a "com-
pelling" interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological 
27. rd. 
28. rd. at 679, 422 N.E.2d at 525-26, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866. 
29. rd. at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65. 
30. rd. at 679-80, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866. 
31. 102 S. Ct. at 3352. 
32. rd. at 3353. 
33. rd. 
5
Bloodworth: First Amendment Infringement
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
480 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:475 
well-being of a minor."84 As authority for its determination the 
Court cited pertinent common law developments,8lI as well as the 
New York State Legislature's findings on the subject.86 More-
over, the opinion found that according to both legislative find-
ings and relevant literature, "the use of children as subjects of 
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emo-
tional, and mental health of the child."s7 
34. Id., citing Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). 
35. The Court began with the premise that "a democratic society rests, for its con-
tinuance, upon a healthy well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citi-
zens." Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3354, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). 
Further, the Court referred to situations in which the state's interest in protecting the 
well-being of minors was sustained notwithstanding adverse effects on free speech. See 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
36. There has been a proliferation of children as subjects in sexual 
performances. The care of children is a sacred trust and 
should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a 
commercial network based on the exploitation of children. 
The public policy of the state demands the protection of chil-
dren from exploitation through sexual performances. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW, ch. 910 § 1 (McKinney 1977). The legislature additionally found: 
[T)he sale of these movies, magazines, and photographs de-
Id. 
picting the sexual conduct of children to be so abhorrent to 
the fabric of our society that it urges law enforcement officers 
to aggreBBively seek out and prosecute both the peddlers of 
children and the promoters of this filth by vigorously applying 
the sanctions contained in this act. 
37. The use of children as ... subjects of pornographic materials 
is very harmful to both the children and the society as a 
whole. S. Rep. No. 95-438, p. 5 (1978). It has been found that 
sexually exploited children are unable to develop healthy af-
fectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, 
and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults. 
Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 
19 J. Am. Acad. Child Psych. 239, 296 (1980); ... Schoettle, 
Treatment of the Child Pornography Patient, 137 Am. J. 
Psych. 1109, 1110 (1980); Dansen-Gerner, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography: Medical, Legal and Societal Aspects 
of the Commercial Exploitation of Children, reprinted in U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Sexual Abuse of Chil-
dren: Selected Readings at 80 (1980) ... (sexually exploited 
children pre-disposed to self-destructive behavior such as drug 
and alcohol abuse or prostitution). See generally A. Burgess & 
L. Holmstrom, AcceBBory-to-Sex: Pressure, Sex and Secrecy, in 
BurgeBB, Sexual ABBault of Children and Adolescents 85, 94 
(1978); V. DeFrancis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex 
Crimes Committed by Adults, 169 (1969); Ellerstein & 
Canavan, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 134 Am. J. Diseases of Chil-
dren 255, 256-257 (1980); Finch, Adult Seduction of the Child: 
6
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In its second point, the Court declared that the distribution 
of recorded sexual performances involving children is inherently 
associated with the exploitation and abuse of children in at least 
two ways.8S First, the dissemination of materials depicting sexual 
performances of children exacerbates the harmful effects upon 
those children stemming from the existence of a permanent re-
cord of their acts. Second, the opinion stated that channels of 
circulation must be closed in order to effectively curtail the 
abuse of children targeted by the statute. 89 
The majority ended its discussion on distribution by explic-
itly rejecting application of the Miller standard in the realm of 
child pornography.'o The Court affirmed the state's contention 
that the Miller standard is not dispositive given the state's com-
pelling interest in protecting the welfare of its youth.41 The 
Court noted that whether the work as a whole appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex, whether the specific depictions are pa-
tently offensive or whether the work as a whole contains serious 
social value, bears no significance when ascertaining the harm 
suffered by juvenile participants.'s 
The third point involved the advertising and selling of child 
pornography. The Court essentially stated that freedom of 
speech cannot be at issue where the expression challenged is 
part of an effort to promote illegal commercial activity." The 
Effects on the Child, 7 Med. Aspects of Human Sexuality 170, 
185 (1973); Groth, Sexual Trauma in the Life Histories of 
Rapists and Child Molestors, 4 Victimology 10 (1979). Sexual 
molestation by adults is often involved in the production of 
child sexual performances. Sexual Exploitation of Children, A 
Report to Illinois General Assembly by the Illinois Legislative 
Investigatory Comm'n at 30-31 (1980) ... When such per-
formances are recorded and distributed, the child's privacy in-
terests are also invaded. 
102 S. Ct. at 3355. 
38.ld. 
39. The Court noted that thirty-five states and Congress have concluded that such 
restraints on distribution are required to effectively combat child pornography. ld. 
40. The Court referred to the defendant's argument that the prohibition of distrib-
uting obscene materials would suffice as a means of combating child pornography. ld. at 
3357. Yet, why the Miller standard should be explicitly rejected within the context of 
distribution controls is unclear. 
41. ld. at 3357. 
42. ld. at 3357-58. 
43. "It has rarely been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and 
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in 
7
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opinion additionally noted that, as with the distribution, the 
regulation of advertising and selling was necessitated by the lack 
of enforceable production laws.44 
In its fourth point, the Court stated, "The value of permit-
ting live performances and photographic reproductions of chil-
dren engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if 
not de minimis."4t! In dismissing any question as to whether the 
statute proscribed a particular literary theme, the Court ob-
served that various alternatives to using children in sexual por-
trayals would not result in the censorship of socially valuable 
expression on the subject of children and sexuality.46 The Court 
concluded that "[t]he First Amendment interest is limited to 
that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more realistic by 
utilizing or photographing children."47 
In its fifth and final point, the Court found, "Recognizing 
and classifying child pornography as a category of material 
outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompati-
ble with our earlier decisions."48 The opinion added that it was 
not rare to accept the constitutionality of content-based pro-
scription, where within the confines of the classification the evil 
to be restricted overwhelmingly outweighed any expressive in-
terest at stake.49 In concluding, it found that "[w]hen a defina-
ble class of material, such as that covered by section 263.15, 
bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children en-
gaged in its production, we think the balance of competing inter-
ests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these 
violation of a valid criminal statute." Gibony v. Empire Storage & Ice. Co., 336 U.S. 490, 
498 (1949). 
[d. 
44. 102 S. Ct. at 3357. 
45. [d. 
46. We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children 
performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals 
would often constitute an important and necessary part of a 
literary performance or scientific or educational work. As the 
trial court in this case observed, if it were necessary for liter-
ary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who per-
haps looked younger could be utilized. Simulation outside the 
prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative. 
47. [d. at 3357-58. 
48. [d. at 3358. 
49. [d. 
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materials as without the protection of the First Amendment."10 
The Court enunciated limitations on state regulation of 
child pornography by means of amending the Miller standard: 
The Miller formulation is adjusted in the follow-
ing respects: a trier of fact need not find that the 
material appeals to the prurient interest of the 
average person; it is not required that sexual con-
duct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive 
manner; the material at issue need not be consid-
ered as a whole.Ol 
The Court noted that "the distribution of descriptions or 
other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which 
do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual 
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment 
protection. "02 The Court also imposed a requirement of scienter 
on the part of the defendant for the imposition of criminal 
responsibility. 
Concerning the statute's alleged underinclusiveness, the ma-
jority recognized early in the opinion that "[t]he prevention of 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a govern-
ment objective of surpassing importance."os After holding that 
section 263.15 sufficiently defines the constitutionally unpro-
tected material subject to regulation, the Court concluded that 
"there is nothing unconstitutionally underinclusive about a stat-
ute that singles out this category of material for proscription."&4 
The Court began its examination of the defendant's over-
breadth challenge by reciting the traditional rule that a person 
to whom the statute may be applied cannot challenge the statute 
on the grounds that it may unconstitutionally apply to others.oo 
The Court pointed to its recognition in Broadrick of "two cardi-
nal principles of constitutional order,"" namely, the personal 
50.Id. 
51. Id. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 3355. 
54. Id. at 3359. 
55. Id. at 3360, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21 (1960); Carmichael v. 
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937); Yazoo & M.N.R. Co. v. Jackson 
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912). 
56. 102 S. Ct. at 3360. 
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nature of constitutional rights,1I7 and the "prudential limita-
tions" with respect to constitutional adjudication.lIs The Court 
added that the prudential limitations both allow the Court to 
focus on individual factual settings and give the state courts the 
opportunity to construe statutes in order to avoid constitutional 
conflicts. III 
As an exception to the traditional rule, the opinion found 
that the first amendment overbreadth doctrine is justified only 
by "weighty countervailing policies."8G One such weighty coun-
tervailing policy is the fear of self-censorship.sl The Court 
voiced its concern for the far reaching implications of striking a 
statute on its face, and noted that the overbreadth doctrine had 
previously been employed with hesitation, and then "only as a 
last resort."112 
The Court accordingly found that "particularly where con-
duct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the over-
breadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as 
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
57. [d. citing McGowan v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420, 429 (1961). 
58. In addition to prudential restraints, the traditional rule is 
grounded in Article III limits on the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to actual cases and controversies. This Court, as is the 
case with all federal courts, "has no jurisdiction to pronounce 
any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, 
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is 
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual 
controversies. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is bound 
by two rules to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never to an-
ticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the ne-
cessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts 
to which it is applied." 
102 S. Ct. at 3360, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21 (1960); Liverpool, New 
York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885). 
59. 102 S. Ct. at 3360. 
60. [d. at 3361, citiIlg United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,22-23 (1960) (an act of 
CongreBB shall not be declared unconstitutional with reference to hypothetical cases). 
61. 102 S. Ct. at 3361, citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (in first amendment contexts the courts are inclined to 
entertain overbreadth challenges in order to protect against inhibition chilling free 
speech); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (overbreadth challenge deemed nec-
eBBMY to prevent chilling of rights for fear of criminal sanctions). 
62. 102 S. Ct. at 3361, citing 413 U.S. at 613 (enforcement of statutes difficult due to 
a wide range of constitutional challenges). 
10
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sweep. "88 The opinion further found, as intimated in Broadrick, 
that the requirement of substantial overbreadth extended "at 
the very least" to situations involving conduct plus speech." 
That the overbreadth must be substantial applies to both civil 
and criminal prohibitions, as well as in actions seeking declara-
tory relief.811 One additional limitation noted by the Court re-
quires that, in potentially severable, impermissibly overbroad 
statutes, only that portion found unconstitutional is to be 
invalidated.88 
In applying these standards for overbreadth, the majority 
held that section 263.15 was not substantially overbroad." With 
regard to the New York Court of Appeal's holding that the regu-
lation of child pornography outside state borders is not within 
the police powers of the state, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded simply that the state may prohibit the distribution of 
unprotected materials produced outside the state consistent 
with the first amendment.88 
In finding that section 263.15 didn't unduly encroach upon 
first amendment rights, the Court viewed the statute as one 
whose "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible appli-
cations."'· The Court acknowledged that while the statute was 
directed at the "hard core of child pornography," a legitimate 
concern was raised with respect to medical tests and other edu-
cational materials. Nevertheless, the Court questioned how often 
it would be necessary to employ children to accommodate edu-
cational purposes, and further suggested that the statute's im-
permissible applications amount to only a "tiny fraction" of the 
materials covered under the statute.'70 Finally, the opinion found 
63. 102 S. Ct. at 3362, citing 413 U.S. at 615. 
M. 102 S. Ct. at 3362. The Supreme Court's analysis thus differed from that of the 
Court of Appeala, in that the latter chose to view the statute as directed at "pure 
speech," and in so doing facially invalidated the statute without a finding that the over-
breadth involved was substantial. 
65. 102 S. Ct. at 3363, citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (extension of 
standing in first amendment cases should be less lenient in the military contezt). 
66. 102 S. Ct. at 3361, citing United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 
363 (1971) (upholding constitutionality of various statutory provisions banning obscene 
materiala, despite emtence of unconstitutional provisions under same act). 
87. 102 S. Ct. at 3383. 
68. 1d. at 3359. 
89. 1d. at 3363. 
70.1d. 
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that any existing overbreadth of section 263.15 "should be cured 
through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its 
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied."TI 
Concurring Opinions 
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the opinion, stressed that 
the Court's holding did not require New York to exempt mate-
rial with serious social value, and suggested that the compelling 
interests may permit the state to constitutionally regulate forms 
of expression without regard for their soCial value.71 She further 
noted that the audience's appreciation of the expression is quite 
irrelevant to the state's interest in protecting ininors from sexual 
exploitation.'" An exception for depictions with serious social 
value would, according to Justice O'Connor, actually increase 
the probability of content-based censorship disfavored by the 
first amendment. She added that the statute did not seek to cen-
sor all expression of child pornography, but only censored that 
expression in which children were engaged for the proscribed il-
licit purposes.74 
In discussing the overbreadth challenge, Justice O'Connor 
suggested that the New York statute may be overbroad on the 
grounds that it bars depictions which don't threaten the harms 
identified by the Court.TO Nonetheless, she also deferred any fur-
ther inquiry, stating that the potential overbreadth was insuffi-
ciently substantial to warrant facial invalidation of the statute. T8 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, 
agreed with the majority in finding that the state is afforded 
greater leeway in regulating pornography, the promotion of 
which harms children.77 They added that the state does not have 
such leeway when protecting consenting adults from such mate-
rial.78 The two Justices also voiced the opinion that regulation of 
71. Id., citing 413 U.S. at 615·16 (Court deferred on overbreadth inquiry where po. 
litical activists challenged constitutionality of state merit system act). 
72. Id. at 3364. 
73.Id. 
74.Id. 
75.Id. 
76.Id. 
77.Id. 
78. Id. at 3365, citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637, 638 n.6, 642·43 n.IO; Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (Brennan, J.). 
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expression with serious redeeming social value would violate the 
first amendment, asserting that the state's interest in regulating 
depictions of sexually involved children is likely to be far less 
compelling where the depictions are serious contributions to art 
or science.'19 With respect to the overbreadth attack, the Justices 
agreed with the Court in that the tiny fraction of material with 
serious social value conceivably within the realm of the statute is 
insufficient to justify striking the statute by means of the over-
breadth doctrine.80 
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, focused his 
opinion on the Court's mode of analysis with respect to the over-
breadth challenge. After accepting as "clear" both the constitu-
tionality of criminal prosecution for the defendant's conduct and 
the statute's reach into constitutionally protected areas of ex-
pression, Justice Stevens addressed the "critical" issue of the 
appropriateness of the overbreadth doctrine in a first amend-
ment context. The Justice stated that an inquiry into first 
amendment protection demands consideration of both content 
and context,81 and noted that the Court made an "empirical" 
judgment in concluding that impermissible application of the 
statute amounted to only a tiny fraction of material within the 
statute's reach.81 
Justice Stevens labeled both the Appellate Court's and the 
Supreme Court's mode of analysis as extreme, explaining that 
while the Court's approach would deprive an entire film of con-
stitutional protection based only on the existence of one lewd 
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3365. 
SO.Id. 
81. Id. 
82. The Court's analysis is directed entirely at the permissi· 
bility of the statute's coverage of non-obscene material. Its 
empirical evidence, however, is drawn substantially from con-
greBBional committee reports that ultimately reached the con-
clusion that a prohibition against obscene child pornogra-
phy-coupled with sufficiently stiff sanctions-is an adequate 
response to this social problem. The Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary concluded that "virtually all of the materials that 
are normally considered child pornography are obscene under 
current standards," and that "in comparison with this blatant 
pornography, non-obscene materials that depict children are 
very few and very inconsequential." 
Id. at 3365 n.4. 
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scene, the Appellate Court's approach in the same instance 
would require striking the entire statute on the ground of over-
breadth.sa In support of his refusal to entertain the overbreadth 
challenge, Justice Stevens asserted that adjudications involving 
concrete factual situations tend to be crafted with greater wis-
dom.B4 Alternatively, Justice Steven's own intermediate ap-
proach would refuse to apply the overbreadth doctrine, opting 
rather for case-by-case analysis.slI 
CRITIQUE 
The Court enunciated the new test for child pornography 
only insofar as it may be compared to the Miller standard. 
The test for child pornography is separate from 
the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but 
may be compared to it for purpose of clarity. The 
Miller formulation is adjusted in the following re-
spects: A trier of fact need not find that the mate-
rial appeals to the prurient interest of the average 
person; it is not required that sexual conduct por-
trayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; 
and the material at issue need not be considered 
as a whole.ee 
Referring directly to the Miller opinion, the Court stated 
that "[a] state offense must also be limited to works which, 
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, 
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value."S7 Focusing on the third element of both the 
Miller and Ferber tests, i.e., whether the work is to be consid-
ered as a whole, one can only conclude from the specific lan-
guage of the opinions that the Ferber Court's statement "and 
the material at issue need not be considered as a whole" refers 
to the social value inquiry. Hence, the new formula articulated 
in Ferber apparently would remove child pornography from first 
amendment protection, provided that the content to be regu-
lated is adequately defined by state law, that sexual conduct in-
83. rd. at 3367. 
84. rd. 
85. rd. 
86. rd. at 3358. 
87. 413 U.S. at 24. 
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volving children is portrayed, and that those depictions at issue 
lack serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific value." 
Notwithstanding the explicit articulation of the Ferber 
formula, intimations by the Court suggest an actual narrowing of 
the social value inquiry to the point of insignificance, thereby 
allowing for an even greater degree of first amendment infringe-
ment. The Court specifically restricted the first amendment in-
terest to that of making the portrayals more "realistic" by utiliz-
ing children.89 The Court added that the necessity of using 
children for the above-stated purpose probably would not arise 
often.90 In conjunction, the Court found that "[w]hen a definable 
class of material, such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so 
heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its 
production, we think the balance of competing interests is 
clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materi-
als as without the protection of the First Amendment,'''} This 
statement suggests that the state's interest in protecting chil-
dren from sexual exploitation will always be so overwhelming as 
to outweigh any expressive interest at stake, presuming the ap-
plicability of a narrowly defined statute. Hence, the Ferber 
formula essentially would remove all works containing actual 
sexual portrayals of children from the realm of first amendment 
protection. 
The Ferber formula, including the aforementioned implica-
tions for its application, indicates an increasing willingness of 
the Court to sustain the constitutionality of statutes embodying 
compelling state interests, even where doing so would result in 
sacrificing the sanctity of the first amendment. The perimeters 
of this shift away from the approach of prior decisions may be 
perceived in the concurring opinions of Justice O'Connor and 
Justices Brennan and Marshall. In stressing that the Court did 
not hold that New York must excise material with serious social 
value from its statute, Justice O'Connor went so far as to suggest 
that compelling interests may allow the state to regulate expres-
sion without regard for its social value.9l1 Conversely, Justice 
88. 102 S. Ct. at 3358. 
89. 1d. at 3357-58. 
90. 1d. at 3357. 
91. 1d. at 3358. 
92. 1d. at 3359. 
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Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, asserted that regu-
lation of expression with serious social value would violate the 
first amendment.11I Yet, even Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
traditionally first amendment enthusiasts, joined the majority in 
restricting the social value inquiry from the whole work to the 
specific portrayals prohibited by statute. e4 
The underlying reasons behind the Court's formulation of a 
new standard in the realm of child pornography may be viewed 
as twofold. Primarily, all members of the Court concurred that a 
state has a compelling interest in protecting its youth from sex-
ual abuse and exploitation. ell This interest may be distinguished 
from those arising in other first amendment challenges, in that 
the state seeks to protect a particularly vulnerable group of ac-
tors involved in the expression itself, rather than the viewers of 
the particular expression. Additionally, the expression herein 
concerned is overtly sexual, and while members of the Court 
previously have expressed reluctance to allow state regulation of 
purely sexual materials, the description of materials subject to 
censorship under section 263.15 indisputably verges on the am-
bit of obscenity, an area of expression transgressing any first 
amendment concerns." 
Despite rendering a judgment premised on sound underly-
ing considerations, and one which is largely consistent with pre-
vious opinions in the area of first amendment litigation, the 
Court's analysis with respect to the social value inquiry revealed 
a disturbing departure from precedent. In Roth v. United 
States,e7 the Court resolved the social value inquiry by declaring 
obscenity to be that which is "utterly without redeeming social 
importance," stating further that "the portrayal of sex, e.g., in 
art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason 
to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of 
speech and press."es In Jacobellis v. Ohio,ee Justice Brennan 
93. Id. at 3365. 
94.1d. 
95. The Court stated that it would not second-guess the legislative judgment. Id. at 
3355. 
96. Respondent's counsel conceded that a finding that the films are obscene would 
have been consistent with the Miller standard. Id. at 3365 n.l. 
97. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
98. Id. at 484, 487. 
99. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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wrote, "Nor may the constitutional status of the material be 
made to turn on a weighing of its social importance against its 
prurient appeal, for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is ut-
terly without social importance. "100 Justice Brennan adhered to 
this position in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,101 by stating that "a 
book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly with-
out redeeming social value. This is so though the book is found 
to possess the requisite prurient appeal to be patently ofi"en-
sive."102 In Miller v. California, lOS the Court directed its inquiry 
to "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value."l04 Thus, the Ferber Court's 
narrowing of the social value inquiry to the specific sexual por-
trayals at issue represents a clear departure from the whole-
work analysis of prior decisions. 
This departure from the approach of prior decisions is un-
settling because the Court is, in essence, denying first amend-
ment guarantees to socially valuable expressions within a work 
also containing child pornography. As Justice Brennan observed 
in Ferber, "the limited classes of speech, the suppression of 
which does not raise serious First Amendment concerns, have 
two attributes. They are of exceedingly 'slight social value,' and 
the State has a compelling interest in their regulation."loll By 
having traditionally focused its inquiry on the entire work, the 
Court had recognized that socially valuable expressions were to 
be afforded at least some weight when ascertaining whether con-
stitutional protection extended to the work at issue. Presuma-
bly, the Ferber Court narrowed the social value inquiry to the 
individual portrayals in order to underscore the superiority of 
New York's compelling interest over any existing first amend-
ment concerns. However, this was unnecessary in light of the 
Court's explicit use of a purported balancing test when it conclu-
sively found the materials in Ferber to be without the protection 
of the first amendment. The Court's balancing test, and the im-
plications for its use in the realm of child pornography, alone 
would have constituted sufficient grounds for upholding New 
100. [d. at 191. 
101. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
102. [d. at 419. 
103. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
104. [d. at 25. 
105. 102 S. Ct. at 3365. 
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York's statute against the first amendment challenge.lo8 Thus, 
the Ferber Court's approach unnecessarily would have denied 
recognition of any constitutional protection to expressions with 
serious social value, had they existed. 
Concerning the defendant's overbreadth challenge, the 
Court essentially concluded that the New York statute was not 
to be facially invalidated except on a determination of substan-
tial overbreadth in its conceivable applications. In this respect, 
the Court expressed doubt as to whether the impermissible ap-
plications amounted to more than a tiny fraction of all applica-
tions under the statute. While having found the New York stat-
ute not substantially overbroad, the Court nevertheless failed 
to provide any guidelines for determining when a statute is 
substantially overbroad for the purposes of the overbreadth 
doctrine. 
Justice Stevens would have refused to entertain an over-
breadth challenge premised on first amendment concerns, opting 
rather to review only the facts of each case.107 While thereby 
avoiding the problem of defining standards for substantial over-
breadth, the implications of Justice Steven's approach admit-
tedly are that a potentially overbroad statute would tend to re-
sult in a chilling of free speech because of self-censorship.lo8 In 
support of his position, Justice Stevens minimized the adverse 
effects of self-censorship as compared to the broad, unambigious 
state-imposed censorship advocated by the majority. lOS Yet, self-
censorship potentially could result in a significantly more serious 
chilling of free speech, primarily in situations involving highly 
overbroad statutes. Thus, whereas Justice Stevens disagreed 
with the majority and sought to afford "marginal speech," such 
as the portrayals in Ferber, some first amendment protection, llO 
his refusal to apply the overbreadth doctrine in situations in-
volving highly overbroad statutes would likely undermine his ex-
press intentions. 
106. See discussion and accompanying text, notes 88·96, supra, as to the Ferber 
formula and the implications of its application. 
107. See supra note 82. 
108. 102 S. Ct. at 3367. 
109. rd. 
110. rd. at 3367·68. 
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Justice O'Connor's overbreadth· analysis, while consistent 
with the majority in requiring substantial overbreadth for facial 
invalidation, nevertheless focused on different factors when in-
quiring into the New York statute's conceivably impermissible 
applications. Justice O'Connor asserted that "it is quite possible 
that New York's statute is overbroad because it bans depictions 
that do not actually threaten the harms identified by the 
Court."111 This is distinguished from the Court's statement that 
"[h]ow often, if ever, it may be necessary to employ children to 
engage in conduct clearly within the reach of the section 263.15 
in order to produce educational, medical or artistic works cannot 
be known with certainty."llSI The Court's reference to the neces-
sity of employing children signified that it was looking to expres-
sions with serious social value as providing instances of potential 
overbreadth. In limiting her overbreadth inquiry to ascertaining 
whether there would be a substantial number of occasions in 
which the state's compelling interest would be lacking, Justice 
O'Connor more aptly taiiored application of the overbreadth 
doctrine to the underlying rationale of the holding in Ferber. 
That is, as it was the compelling interest of the state which, ac-
cording to the Ferber formula, would remove all expressions 
containing child pornography from the scope of first amendment 
guarantees, only situations where such a compelling state inter-
est would be substantially lacking would justify facial invalida-
tion of the statute. Moreover, the type of situation contemplated 
by Justice Stevens as a reason for refusing to entertain the over-
breadth challenge would be equally well incorporated into Jus-
tice O'Connor's analysis, albeit without sacrificing the over-
breadth doctrine altogether.1l8 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court's removal of child por-
nography from first amendment protection in Ferber was pre-
mised explicitly on the state's compelling interest in preventing 
111. rd. at 3364. 
112. rd. at 3363. 
113. As a hypothetical of a potentially overbroad application, Justice Stevens of-
fered the example of a foreign film cont.aining child pornography, where the juvenile 
participant resided abroad. Justice Stevens noted that in such a case the state interest 
would be far leBS compelling than in the present case. rd. at 3366-67. Similarly, Justice 
O'Connor addreBBed a similar scenario as being an instance in which the compelling in-
terests identified by the Court would not be triggered. rd. at 3364. 
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sexual abuse and exploitation of its youth. The analysis em-
ployed in Ferber may be distinguished from that in other cases 
raising first amendment issues, in that the majority of excep-
tions to first amendment applicability have been founded not on 
the strength of the state's interest in suppression, but rather 
upon a finding that the expression at issue lacked the socially 
valuable aspects promoted by the first amendment. The unani-
mous decision in Ferber suggests the Court's willingness to part 
from established modes of first amendment analysis in order to 
sustain the constitutionality of laws embodying compelling state 
interests. 
While having found the prevention of child pornography a 
compelling state interest, and one which by definition was so 
overwhelming as to outweigh any expressive interests at stake, 
the Court nevertheless failed to provide any guidelines for deter-
mining when other state interests might also be so compelling. 
Thus, although the Court restricted the Ferber formula to appli-
cation in the narrow realm of child pornography, the underlying 
rationale of the Court could be applied to other areas tradition-
ally protected by the first amendment. The inherent risks of cre-
ating exceptions to fundamental legal principles, such as child 
pornography with respect to the first amendment, are that small 
encroachments may lead to significant erosions. Such a prospect 
is particularly alarming where the first amendment is concerned, 
an amendment which embodies principles central to both our 
system of law and government. Nevertheless, provided the 
state's interest is in fact as compelling as that of New York in 
Ferber, then first amendment infringement is not only compel-
ling, but commendable. 
Jon M. Bloodworth, 111* 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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